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Allocating The Costs Of Parental Free
Exercise: Striking A New Balance
Between Sincere Religious Belief
And A Child's Right To
Medical Treatment
Paula A. Monopoli*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death.... Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their chil-
dren before they have reached the age of full legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves. 1
It has been almost fifty years since the United States Supreme
Court wrote these presumably unambiguous words in Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts. Yet children in this country are still being martyred on
the altar of their parents' religious beliefs. Parents cloaking them-
selves in the first amendment and its free exercise clause are denying
their children medical treatment and those children are dying.2
Robyn Twitchell was such a child. He died on April 8, 1986, at the
age of two. Robyn died as a result of an obstructed bowel, a medical
condition which is readily remedied by surgery with little risk to the
* Attorney, Hill & Barlow, Boston, Massachusetts. B.A., 1980, Yale University;
J.D., 1983, University of Virginia. Vice Chairperson, American Bar Association Com-
mittee on Children and the Law; Vice Chairperson, Legislative Subcommittee, Massa-
chusetts Bar Association Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children. The
author is grateful to Marin Scordato for his invaluable assistance with and insights into
this article. She would also like to thank Josephine Foehrenbach Brown for her en-
lightening thoughts on this topic. All views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not represent those of any organization of which she is a member.
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67, 170 (1944).
2. See infra text accompanying note 23. The free exercise clause of the first
amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
patient. Robyn's parents were not poor nor were they uneducated.
They lived in Boston, within minutes of the nation's best teaching
hospitals. Yet when Robyn became seriously ill, his parents failed to
make use of those hospitals and the lifesaving technology they
offered.
Robyn's parents are Christian Scientists. Christian Scientists rely
on spiritual healing as opposed to medical science as the primary
treatment for disease and illness. Rather than calling a physician
when Robyn was ill, the Twitchells called a Christian Science practi-
tioner. They also called a Church official who indicated that contin-
ued use of prayer alone was lawful. Had they inquired further as to
their legal obligation to obtain medical care for Robyn, the Church
would have told them that they had none.3
A. A Proposal for Judicial, Legislative, and Regulatory Reform
The Church bases its position that the Twitchells had no legal duty
to provide Robyn with medical treatment upon an exemption under
the Massachusetts child neglect law.4 That exemption prevents the
state from prosecuting a parent for the misdemeanor of child neglect
for the sole reason that a parent relies on treatment by spiritual
means instead of seeking medical attention for a child. Similar ex-
emptions can be found in virtually every state in the country.5 The
3. The Christian Science publication, LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENTISTS IN MASSACHUSETTS (1983), instructs parents that they can never suffer
the "imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent for failure to provide medical
care because of religious beliefs" as a result of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4)
(West 1990), despite the fact that this statute has never been authoritatively construed
by a court of law. Just Rep. on Inquest Relating to the Death of Robyn Twitchell,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, District Court Department, Suffolk County, West
Roxbury Division, Inquest No. I of 1986, at 23, [hereinafter Just Rep. on Inquest]. The
District Court Inquest Report was based on evidence received during six days of hear-
ings held in December 1986. Justice Lawrence D. Shubow's findings are included in
the Report.
4. That exemption provides:
A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or lack proper physical care for
the sole reason that he is being provided remedial treatment by spiritual
means alone in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church
or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof.
(MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1990)).
5. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b) (1987); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1989); ARK. STAT ANN. § 12-12-502(3) (1987); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 270 (West 1988). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300, 300.5 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103(1) (Supp. 1989)(amended in 1989 to provide
that the religious rights of a parent shall not limit a child's access to medical care in a
life-threatening situation or when the condition will result in a serious handicap or dis-
ability); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(f) (West Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-4
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd 1988
& Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4(a),-5(c) (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 726.6(l) (West 1979 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(l)(c) (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 600.020(l) (Baldwin Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(5)
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United States Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the va-
lidity of these exemptions. It is time for the Court to breathe new
life into its decision in Prince6 and strike down such exemptions on
public policy grounds. In the meantime, state legislatures and the
Department of Health and Human Services should take the initiative
in repealing these statutory exemptions.
Robyn Twitchell's parents were subsequently tried and convicted
of manslaughter. Other courts have recently found parents who prac-
tice spiritual healing guilty of manslaughter or felony child endan-
germent. 7 These parents have relied on the exemptions under state
(West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp. 1988); MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 5-701(n)(2) (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West
1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.378(1)(a)(1) (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(l)(i), (m) (1972 & Supp.
1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(4)
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5085 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3,(XIX)(c)
(Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(L)(5), -
3(M)(4) (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
517(21) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.22(A) (Baldwin 1987) (statute was invalidated in State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio
Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. Coshocton 1984); see also infra notes 136-56 and ac-
companying text)), § 2151.03, .421(A)(1) (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 852 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) (amended to read "provided, that medical care shall be
provided where permanent physical damage could result to such child"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419.500(1) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-11-15 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C)(3) (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (1984 & Supp. 1990)(amended in 1990 to provide that medi-
cal treatment may be ordered by the court for a child being treated solely by spiritual
means); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-157(c) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (1987);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(C) (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(2) (1988);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3(g)(2)(A)
(1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West 1987); WYO. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(vii)
(1978). In Maryland, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennes-
see, the statutes use such phrases as "non-medical remedial care" rather than spiritual
healing.
6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7. See Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990) (parents convicted of felony
child abuse and third degree murder where parents treated daughter suffering from
juvenile diabetes solely with spiritual means and daughter subsequently died from dia-
betic ketoacidosis); Funkhauser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (parents
convicted of manslaughter in the second degree where their three-month-old son died
of pneumonia after parents relied on religious healing), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2066
(1989); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986) (parents convicted of reckless homicide
and neglect of a dependent when son died of acute bronchial pneumonia after being
treated solely with prayer); Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(parents convicted of reckless homicide where nine-month-old daughter died from bac-
terial meningitis after being treated solely with prayer); Commonwealth v. Bainhart,
345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985) (parents convicted of both involuntary man-
slaughter and child endangerment where child died from untreated tumor), appeal de-
nied, 517 Pa. 620, 538 A.2d 814 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
child abuse and neglect statutes as a defense to these criminal
charges.8 More often than not, their reliance on spiritual healing has
resulted in their children's deaths and their own anguish. While this
Article does not address the validity of such convictions, it does sug-
gest that the only way to avoid such unnecessary deaths and subse-
quent parental prosecutions in the future is to abolish statutory
exemptions to child abuse and neglect laws through judicial, legisla-
tive, or regulatory means, or through a combination of such means.
This Article first lays out the brutal facts of Robyn Twitchell's
death. Any discussion of this issue must be grounded in a clear un-
derstanding of the unnecessary pain and suffering that children often
endure when their parents practice spiritual healing to the exclusion
of medical science. It then discusses the origins of the exemptions
and how various courts have ruled on this issue both before and after
the exemptions were enacted.
The Article then explores the premise that not only are these ex-
emptions not constitutionally required but in fact they may be consti-
tutionally defective. The Article concludes that the only way to
prevent the unnecessary deaths of children who suffer from disease
that is readily and effectively treatable by medical science is by the
repeal of the statutory exemptions. Abolition of the exemptions will
prevent confusion as to the nature of the parental duty to provide
medical assistance to seriously ill children. The primary goal of this
Article is to establish that such abolition does not run afoul of a par-
ent's constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Absent such a direct approach to the issue of whether parents who
practice spiritual healing may be held liable for their children's
deaths, judicial attempts to reconcile the statutory exemptions and
the criminal law are doomed to incoherence and confusion, and chil-
dren will continue to die needlessly. The issue calls for an unflinch-
ing appreciation of the interests at stake. In furtherance of such an
understanding, what follows is an account of the last illness and
death of two-year-old Robyn Twitchell.
B. The Twitchell Case
David and Ginger Twitchell are third generation members of the
First Church of Christ, Scientist. In 1986, they were living with their
two sons, Jeremy and Robyn, in Hyde Park, a middle-class Boston
neighborhood. Boston is also the home of the Christian Science
Church, founded in 1879 by Mary Baker Eddy.
Christian Science is a religious system of thought which empha-
8. For a list of statutory exemptions, see supra note 5.
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sizes spiritual healing as a practical expression of Christian living.9
However, "while Christian Scientists prefer spiritual healing there is
no positive ban on resort to medical (surgical, dental) care, under
some circumstances at least."10 Christian Science as an institution
also "calls upon its adherents to be law-abiding... when the meaning
of the law is unambiguously clear.""i
David and Ginger Twitchell were committed to raising their chil-
dren without medical attention. They relied on spiritual healing to
cure any illnesses the children might have.12 Despite this commit-
ment to spiritual treatment for their children, a medical doctor at-
tended Ginger Twitchell at Robyn's birth, and David Twitchell had
been to a dentist for treatment.1 3 Ginger Twitchell also wears glasses
and has had cataract surgery.1 4
Robyn Twitchell's fatal illness began on April 3, 1986, and ended in
his tragic death five days later. What follows is a brief summary of
the events leading up to his death.
Thursday, April 3, 1986.
After dinner Thursday evening, Robyn began to scream and vomit
and appeared to be in severe pain. He continued to vomit during the
night and was unable to sleep well.15
Friday, April 4, 1986.
Ginger Twitchell called Nancy Calkins, a Christian Science Practi-
tioner, and Nathan Talbot, a Christian Science Church official.
Robyn had pain in his lower abdomen and was still vomiting. He con-
tinued to vomit when fed during the day.1 6
Saturday, April 5, 1986.
Robyn continued vomiting. Mrs. Calkins went to the Twitchell
home to pray. Robyn was quiet during the day and the practitioner
9. Just. Rep. on Inquest, supra note 3, at 11.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 4. Like many Christian Scientists, David Twitchell grew up seeing den-
tists. According to church spokesman Nathan Talbot, dental care is a "gray area" in
which Christian Scientists may seek treatment without feeling that doing so is a tre-
mendous breach of faith. "Other gray areas include setting broken bones and getting
fitted for eyeglasses. Christian Scientists may also have a doctor or midwife attend
childbirth." See, Twitchell Tells of Test of Faith, Boston Globe, Aug. 8, 1990, (Metro/
Region) at 1.
14. Just. Rep. on Inquest, supra note 3, at 4.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
spoke with Ginger Twitchell by telephone that evening.' 7
Sunday, April 6, 1986.
Ginger Twitchell again called the Christian Science practitioner
twice to report that Robyn was not holding his food down. The prac-
titioner then called Nathan Talbot to report Robyn's condition. She
also gave the Twitchells the name of a Christian Science nurse,
whom they then called. The practitioner came to the house to pray
again that evening.' 8
Monday, April 7, 1986.
The Christian Science nurse, Linda Blaisdell, came to the house.
She suggested bland foods and liquid. (In the opinion of the medical
witnesses who testified at the Inquest, feeding Robyn was the wrong
thing to do in light of the blockage. It produced more vomiting and
dehydration). The nurse left and Robyn later had a painful bowel
movement. Ginger Twitchell again called the practitioner to report
that Robyn was not holding down his food.' 9
Tuesday, April 8, 1986.
Robyn began vomiting at 8:00 p.m. The vomiting had a strange
smell. Robyn gave his mother a pleading look. She became alarmed
and called the practitioner whose telephone line was busy. She then
called Nathan Talbot. He urged her to keep trying the practitioner
whom she finally reached.20
The practitioner came to the home to pray. The nurse was also
called. Robyn began to have spasms at 10:00 p.m. His eyes rolled up
and he lost consciousness. The practitioner called Nathan Talbot and
told him that she thought "the baby had passed." He recommended
that they call an undertaker.2 '
David Twitchell called Waterman's Funeral Home at 10:10 p.m.
They suggested that he call 911, and then called the medical exam-
iner's office, which sent an emergency medical services ambulance to
the Twitchell home. The ambulance arrived at 10:59 p.m. 22
The Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT's) found Robyn alone
on a rug, in cardiac arrest and with no vital signs. Rigor mortis had
already set in. The EMT's administered CPR to Robyn and then
transported him to the Carney Hospital. He was pronounced dead at
11:27 p.m. The physician on call stated that the underlying cause of
Robyn's death was bowel obstruction. In his opinion, had medical
assistance been sought earlier, the obstruction in the bowel could
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 6-7.
22. Id. at 7.
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have been readily corrected by surgery with an almost one hundred
percent chance of success. Additionally, in the opinion of the medical
examiner who later performed the autopsy on Robyn, had David
Twitchell called the EMT's immediately, Robyn could have been re-
suscitated up to one-half hour after cardiac arrest.23
The story of Robyn Twitchell is not unique. Cases and newspapers
have reported dozens of instances where children have died from
readily treatable diseases because their parents eschewed medical
care in favor of spiritual healing.24 These are not hard cases. For the
most part they involve diseases which readily respond to medical sci-
ence or which involve routine surgery or treatment. Robyn Twitch-
eli's obstructed bowel could have been cured by relatively painless
surgical intervention. However, in defense of these spiritual methods
of treatment, the Christian Science Church proffers the argument
that children whose parents provide medical treatment for them still
die from disease every day.25 This is in fact correct; however, the
point is inapposite. What the legal community is facing here are
cases where children are dying from readily treatable diseases, rather
than diseases where the prognosis is dim even when the children are
provided with the best medical care that society can offer.
Justice Lawrence Shubow, who prepared the Report on Inquest
Relating to the Death of Robyn Twitchell, 26 found that the facts sur-
rounding Robyn's death warranted the prosecution of his parents for
involuntary manslaughter. 27 David and Ginger Twitchell were con-
victed of that crime on July 4, 1990, and sentenced to ten years' pro-
bation.28 In the past two years, there have been four similar
23. Id. at 7-8.
24. See, e.g., Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 559 (1990); Note, California's Prayer Healing Dilemma, 14 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 395, 401 nn.53-55 (1987); Dobbin, In Treating Sick Children, Says Califor-
nia, Prayer Is Not Enough; When a State Takes Aim at Faith Healing, U.S. News &
World Rep., Mar. 24, 1986, at 22; Ostling, Matters of Faith and Death; Courts Move
Against Parents Who Deny Children Medical Care, Time, Apr. 16, 1984, at 42; Dolnick,
When Faith and Medicine Collide, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1990, (Religion), at 14 (Health
Supp.); Lewin, Ideas & Trends; When It's One Absolute Right Against Another, N.Y.
Times, May. 29, 1988, § 4, at 18, col. 1; Shaw, Children Are Suffering as Faith Healers
Hide Behind Religious-Exemption Shield, L.A. Times, Mar. 23, 1988, Part II (Metro), at
7, col. 1 (home ed.).
25. See Talbot, Christian Science and the Care of Children: The Position of the
Christian Science Church, 309 NEW ENG. J. OF MED., No. 126, at 1641-44 (Dec. 29, 1983);
Johnsen, Christian Scientists and the Medical Profession: A Historical Perspective,
MED. HERITAGE, at 70-77 (Jan./Feb. 1986); Dolnick, supra note 24, at 14.
26. Just. Rep. on Inquest, supra note 3.
27. Id. at 28.
28. In Massachusetts, a manslaughter conviction can carry a penalty of up to
convictions of Christian Scientist parents who failed to seek medical
treatment for their children.29 These convictions raise a myriad of is-
sues, including civil and criminal liability, free exercise of religion,
fair notice and due process, and the fundamental issue of a child's
right to life. However, a recurring theme in these cases is the par-
ents' belief that the spiritual healing exemption under the state's
child abuse and neglect statute protects them from prosecution as a
result of their child's death. The justice who conducted the Inquest
into Robyn Twitchell's death said of the exemption at issue:
G. L. c. 273, § 1, as amended in 1971 is ambiguous. Only legalistic analysis ren-
ders its reach clear. On its face, it could easily lead a religious family to be-
lieve its beliefs to have won public endorsement and validation .... To the
extent the local statutes preserve the confusion they should be reviewed and
corrected so that all concerned can receive a clear view of their rights and ob-
ligations to replace the hazy one now prevailing.
3 0
It remains to be seen whether the Twitchells' conviction will with-
stand scrutiny at the appellate level. 31 However, it is clear from this
and other recent convictions that parents are being mislead by the
statutory exemptions and that their children are at risk of injury and
twenty years in prison. The Twitchells were also ordered to take their three other
children for regular medical examinations. Christian Scientists Are Given Probation
for Death of Child, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1990, § 1 (Nat'l Desk), at 8, col. 5. Defense
counsel in the Twitchell case argued that ordering the Twitchells to take their chil-
dren for such exams was a "separate sentence on the children, in violation of their
constitutional rights." Wong, Twitchell Sentence: 10 Years' Probation, Boston Globe,
July 7, 1990, (Metro/Region), at 2 (city ed.). Defense counsel's fees were paid by the
Christian Science Church. Chambers, Deliberating Faith, Law and a Life, THE NAT'L
L.J., July 2, 1990, (sua sponte) at 13.
29. Sanders, Convicted of Relying on Prayer; A Manslaughter Case Tests the Lim-
its of Religious Liberty, Time, July 16, 1990, (Law) at 52. Over the last two years,
Christian Scientist parents have been convicted of criminal conduct in four other cases.
Instead of sentencing them to prison, courts in Florida, California, and Arizona have
placed the parents on probation with the requirement that they provide medical treat-
ment for their children in the future. Wong, Christian Science Couple Convicted in
Son's Death, Boston Globe, July 5, 1990, at 1.
30. Just. Rep. on Inquest, supra note 3, at 31, 33.
31. Some commentators have noted that in past years prosecutors have been re-
luctant to prosecute parents, and courts have frequently reversed manslaughter con-
victions of parents who treated their children in accordance with their spiritual beliefs.
For a discussion of case law showing a reluctance to impose criminal liability on par-
ents causing a child's death, see generally Comment, Parental Failure to Provide Child
with Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death - Involun-
tary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90 DICK. L. REV. 861, 872-77 (1986). See also Note,
Criminal Law-- Manslaughter Conviction for Failure to Provide Medical Aid to Child
Because of Religious Belief Reversed, 9 DE PAUL L. REV. 271, 274 (1960) ("[t]he lack of
manslaughter convictions in American courts is the result of a justifiably sympathetic
feeling for those whose religious philosphy has caused their plight"). There are four
recent state cases which have upheld the manslaughter or homicide convictions of par-
ents who relied solely on faith healing for treatment of their children. See supra note
7 for headings of these cases. The United States Supreme Court has never addressed
this issue directly. Note, When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between a Parent's Right to
Free Exercise of Religion Versus His Child's Right to Life, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 586
n.6 (1989) [hereinafter When Rights Clash].
[Vol. 18: 319, 1991] Allocating the Costs
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
death as a result. There is also the continuing dilemma facing trial
judges and appellate courts as to how spiritual healing exemptions
under state child abuse and neglect statutes interact with the crimi-
nal law. Before evaluating the arguments in favor of and against
such exemptions, it is useful to trace their origins and to examine
various judicial approaches to this problem.
II. EARLY JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO PARENTAL FREE EXERCISE AS
A DEFENSE TO FAILING TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE
A. The British Approach
Regina v. Wagstaffe32 is often cited for the common law rule that
a parent cannot be convicted of manslaughter for treating his or her
child by spiritual means alone. In fact, the decision in this case did
no more than leave to the jury the question of whether the religious
belief of the parent was reasonable. In Wagstaffe, the jury returned
a verdict of not guilty33 and the case, which involved a religious sect
in England called the "Peculiar People" who relied on Providence
rather than medical assistance to treat illness, came to stand for the
proposition that parents could not be held criminally liable when
they chose spiritual healing to the exclusion of medical science.34
In response to Regina v. Wagstaffe, Parliament amended the Poor
Law Amendment to include the words "medical aid."35 The revised
law read:
[When any Parent shall willfully neglect to provide adequate Food, Clothing,
Medical Aid, or Lodging for his child .... whereby the Health of such Child
shall have been injured ... he shall be guilty of an Offense .... 36
Seven years after passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act, Re-
gina v. Downes37 held that parents were subject to criminal liability
for failure to provide medical treatment even if such failure was
based upon a sincere religious belief. In that case, two of the judges
involved expressed the view that the conviction could not have been
upheld in the absence of the Poor Law Amendment Act.38 The hold-
ing of Regina v. Downes remains unchallenged by subsequent cases. 39
32. 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868).
33. Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent Children: Manslaughter Lia-
bility of the Christian Scientis 109 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 206 (1960).
34. Id. at 205-06.
35. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, § 37.
36. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 33, at 207.
37. L.R. 1 Q.B. 25 (1875).
38. Id. at 29-30.
39. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 33, at 207.
This approach to criminal liability for parents who rely on spiritual
rather than medical means of treatment was subsequently adopted in
several cases in this country.40
B. American Cases
. Prior to the widespread enactment of exemptions to the child
abuse and neglect statutes, courts in this country recognized that the
failure to provide a child with medical treatment could result in
criminal liability for the child's parents. In Craig v. State,41 the
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that religious belief was not a
defense to a prosecution under the child protection law for failure to
provide medical treatment.42 Similar holdings were made by the
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Pierson,43 and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Owens v. State44 and Beck v.
State.45 However, the Florida Supreme Court, in Bradley v. State,46
took a contrary view and held that the state's definition of man-
slaughter did not include death by denial of medical treatment.47
While the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had found in
Owens and Beck that parents could be criminally liable for relying
solely on spiritual healing, the same court found to the contrary after
a spiritual healing exemption was added to the Oklahoma statute. In
1983, in State v. Lockhart,48 the court held that parents could not be
criminally liable for first degree manslaughter when the underlying
misdemeanor charge contained a religious exemption. 49 However,
the court explicitly stated that the result would have been different
40. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
41. 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (parents convicted of involuntary manslaugh-
ter of infant daughter who died of pneumonia).
42. Id. at 600, 155 A.2d at 690. However, the court reversed the parents' conviction
on the grounds that their behavior was not the proximate cause of their child's death.
Id. at 599, 155 A.2d at 689.
43. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (court held that child endangerment statute
making the failure to provide medical care an offense did not violate the New York
State Constitution's free exercise of religion clause).
44. 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911) (court cited Pierson and upheld conviction
of father who relied on prayer and who failed to provide medical treatment to his child
stricken with typhoid fever, holding that religious belief was no defense to child en-
dangerment prosecution).
45. 29 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 P. 495 (1925) (court followed Owens rule and upheld
the conviction of a father who relied on prayer and failed to provide medical treatment
for his son who subsequently died from tetanus).
46. 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920) (father acquitted of manslaughter where his epi-
leptic daughter suffered a seizure, fell into a fire and subsequently died from her
burns).
47. Id. at 655-56, 84 So. at 679.
48. 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (parents acquitted of first degree man-
slaughter where their nine-year-old son died from peritonitis).
49. Id, at 1060.
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prior to the enactment of the exemption in 1975.50
Thus, state courts in this country have historically been willing to
hold that religious belief is not a defense to criminal liability for par-
ents who practice spiritual healing to the exclusion of medical treat-
ment.5 ' In some cases, the same courts that had found criminal
liability prior to the enactment of an exemption felt compelled to
prohibit parental prosecutions after the enactment of a statutory ex-
emption in their state.5 2 However, in the last few years, several
other state appellate courts have upheld the homicide or manslaugh-
ter convictions of parents under such circumstances. 53 In Walker v.
Superior Court,54 the California Supreme Court recently held that
the state's statutory exemption did not extend to the felony child en-
dangerment and manslaughter statutes and that the state could pros-
ecute a parent whose child died where only spiritual healing was
rendered.55 Despite the existence of statutory exemptions to child
neglect statutes, these decisions indicate an increased acceptance of
criminal prosecution as an appropriate societal response to the prob-
lem of parental reliance on spiritual healing to the exclusion of medi-
cal treatment. But as Justice Shubow noted, the interplay between
the statutory exemptions and the criminal law is confusing and this
disparity should be reconciled5 6
It is this author's belief that such reconciliation should come
through the outright repeal of the exemptions rather than by the
50. Id. at 1060. In a later case, the same court did not allow the exemption as an
absolute defense to a charge of second - as opposed to first - degree manslaughter.
See Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695, 697-698 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2066
(1989), which was decided after the Oklahoma exemption was amended in 1983 to pro-
vide that medical care shall be provided where permanent physical damage could re-
sult to the child. Although the case was decided after amendment of the 1983
exemption, the court applied pre-1983 law because the defendants were charged prior
to enactment of the amendment.
51. However, these courts have used alternative theories to exculpate parents
from liability. See, e.g., Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (conviction of
involuntary manslaughter reversed on grounds of lack of proximate cause). Presuma-
bly, those courts felt that such parents did not intentionally kill their children and
were otherwise caring and loving parents. Thus, while rejecting the defense of reli-
gious belief, these courts searched for alternative grounds to exculpate such parents
under the criminal law.
52. See State v. Lockhart, 644 P.2d at 1060.
53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
54. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989) (in accordance with the tenets of the mother's religion, ailing child received
prayer in lieu of medical treatment and subsequently died from meningitis).
55. Id. at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
amendment of the exemptions to provide that medical care should be
provided to children where serious or permanent bodily injury may
result if such care is not provided.57 Such partial amendment of the
statutory exemptions still forces parents to guess at the line between
protection from prosecution and criminal liability for failing to pro-
vide their child with medical care. As Rita Swan noted in the New
England Journal of Medicine:
[A]buse and neglect laws should be revised so that parents have a duty to pro-
vide medical care for sick children, regardless of their religious beliefs; states
should have the ability to prosecute parents who refuse to meet their duty....
[C]ourt orders have protected many children of Jehovah's Witnesses, but they
are inadequate to protect children in sects that object to all medical treatment
and refuse even to have sick children brought to medical attention. Christian
Science practitioners usually have no knowledge of the disease they are treat-
ing and do not report disease to the state. How will the courts discover these
sick children in time to save their lives? 5 8
The underlying policy goal of the state's regulatory scheme in this
area should be that parents clearly understand the need to provide
regular and consistent medical care to their children and to require
parents to err on the side of obtaining such care rather than waiting
until it is too late, as did David and Ginger Twitchell.59 That result
can only come through holding all parents to the same standard of
care, regardless of their religious beliefs. That is precisely the stan-
dard that existed in most states prior to the widespread enactment in
1974 of statutory exemptions for parents who practice spiritual heal-
ing. In 1947, in Mitchell v. Davis,6 0 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
articulated that standard when it stated:
[O]pposition to medical treatment because of religious belief does not consti-
tute a defense to a prosecution for breach of a statutory duty to furnish a child
with such treatment. Conscientious obedience to what the individual may
consider a higher power or authority must yield to the law of the land where
duties of this character are involved, and since a wicked intent is not an essen-
tial element of the crime, peculiarities of belief as to the proper form of treat-
ment, however honestly entertained, are not necessarily a lawful excuse.6 1
III. THE RECENT ORIGINS OF THE STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
Statutory exemptions which protect parents who practice spiritual
57. For an example of such an amendment, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852(A)
(West Supp. 1990) (exemption amended to read, "medical care shall be provided where
permanent physical damage could result to such child").
58. See Swan, Faith Healing, Christian Science, and the Medical Care of Children,
309 NEw ENG. J. OF MED., No. 26, at 1639-41 (1983).
59. The repeal of the exemptions would not make spiritual healing per se child ne-
glect. Rather, it would have the effect of bringing the issue of children in need of med-
ical treatment to the attention of the courts at an earlier stage. Parents would still
have the opportunity in that forum to demonstrate that the care that they are provid-
ing to their child is adequate and appropriate under the circumstances. If not, the
court could order medical treatment necessary to save a child like Robyn Twitchell.
60. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
61. Id. at 815 (citing 39 AM. JUR. § 115, at 781 (1942)).
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healing are of fairly recent vintage. Ironically, they did not exist in
most states prior to the enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act of 1974.62 Due in part to lobbying by the Chris-
tian Science Church,63 this federal law was interpreted to require
states to amend their child abuse and neglect statutes to include an
exemption for spiritual healing.64 If states failed to amend their stat-
utes to include such exemptions, they would be ineligible to receive
the funds appropriated by Congress to fulfill the intent of the Act -
i.e., to establish preventative programs to reduce the incidence of
child abuse.65
States were required to adopt an exemption which was "the same
in substance" as the one promulgated by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare.66 Virtually all states in the
union complied with this requirement and amended their statutes.67
The adoption of these exemptions over the past twenty years has led
to a counter campaign urging their repeal, led in large part by the
American Academy of Pediatrics and by individual pediatricians.68
Parents like Rita Swan, a former Christian Scientist who in 1977 lost
her infant son to meningitis, have also joined the movement against
these exemptions.69
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5101-5107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
63. Chambers, supra note 28, at 14, col. 4.
64. When Rights Clash, supra note 31, at 591. The Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW) was responsible for implementing and interpreting the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974. HEW thus construed the Act as man-
dating religious exemptions for faith healers. Id. (citing Child Abuse and Neglect Pre-
vention and Treatment Program, 39 Fed. Reg. 43, 935-36 (1974)).
65. Id, (citing Note, Faith Healing Exemptions To Child Protection Laws: Keeping
The Faith Versus Medical Care For Children, 12 J. OF LEGIS. 243, 247 (1985)). Origi-
nally, the exemption did provide for judicial intervention with regard to ordered medi-
cal treatment "where [a child's] health require[d] it." Id. at 591 n.25 (citing Child
Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975)). The
exemption read:
[A] parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who
thereby does not provide specific medical treatment for a child, for that rea-
son alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian; However,
such an exception shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical serv-
ices be provided to the child, where his health requires it.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975) (emphasis in original).
66. Note, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith
Versus Medical Care for Children, 12 J. OF LEGIS. 243, 247 n.45 (1985) [hereinafter
Faith Healing] (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(b) (1975)).
67. Forty-seven states presently have such exemptions. See supra note 5 and ac-
companying text. See also Chambers, supra note 28, at 13, col. 3.
68. Chambers, supra note 28, at 14, col. 4.
69. See supra note 58.
In response to such public comment and pressure, the Department
of Health and Human Services (formerly the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare) issued new regulations regarding religious
exemptions in 1983. These new regulations provide that nothing in
the federal rule should be construed as requiring or prohibiting a
finding of neglect when a parent practicing his or her religious beliefs
does not, on that basis alone, provide medical treatment for his or her
child. The regulation includes a proviso that if such a finding is pro-
hibited by an exemption, that exemption shall not limit an agency or
a court from ordering medical services when a child requires such
services. 70 The 1983 regulations also revised the definition of negli-
gent treatment or maltreatment to include failure to provide ade-
quate medical care, a requirement which was not previously included
in the regulations.71
In 1987, the Department of Health and Human Services sought to
clarify its position even further.72 The Department stated that a
number of comments had been received indicating confusion about
the 1983 regulations. Some expressed concern that state legislators,
agency officials, and members of the public had interpreted the regu-
lation to mandate that a physician be called even when a child exhib-
ited only mild symptoms, even though there was little or no
substantial risk of harm to the child. Those comments included the
concern that state officials were being urged to prosecute all families
solely because they were practicing their religious beliefs by provid-
ing alternative or other remedial health care for their children.73
Other comments focused on the denial of equal protection to children
whose parents were not required to obtain medical treatment for
them. Many of these comments called for departmental regulations
which required reports to the state child protection agency of all in-
stances of failure to provide medical care, regardless of the religious
beliefs of the parents. In addition, they recommended that the de-
70. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(ii) (1983). The regulation reads in part:
Nothing in this part should be construed as requiring or prohibiting a finding
of negligent treatment or maltreatment when a parent practicing his or her
religious beliefs does not, for that reason alone, provide medical treatment for
a child; provided, however, that if such a finding is prohibited, the prohibition
shall not limit the administrative or judicial authority of the State to ensure
that medical services are provided to the child when his health requires it.
71. Id at § 1340.2(d)(3)(i). The regulations required that states include the failure
to provide adequate medical care in their own definitions of neglect and that such fail-
ure be made a reportable condition. Thus, some commentators have noted an apparent
inconsistency in the federal law. In order to receive federal funds, states must provide
that the failure to provide medical treatment constitutes neglect and require that the
neglect be reported. At the same time, the regulations allow a state to have an exemp-
tion for spiritual healing in its child abuse and neglect statute. Faith Healing, supra
note 66, at 248-49.
72. 52 Fed. Reg. 3990 (1987).
73. Id. at 3993.
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partmental regulations affirmatively require states to abolish "reli-
gious exception" statutes altogether. 74
The Department's response to these comments was that it is not,
and was not, the Department's position that the regulations should
be taken as a signal to states to prosecute or require reports on fami-
lies practicing alternative or other remedial health care except where
there is harm or substantial risk of harm to the child's health or wel-
fare. While the requirement that states adopt religious exemptions
was abolished in the final rule published January 26, 1983, the dele-
tion of this provision reflected the Department's "approach to regu-
lating-not a policy shift regarding state protections for parents who
practice their religious beliefs. ' 75 Finally, the Department expressed
its belief that decisions regarding medical care are best made at the
state and local levels by the state child protection agency and the ju-
venile courts.76
Several states have amended their statutes since the 1983 regula-
tions.77 For instance, the Oklahoma exemption 78 has been amended
to include the proviso "that medical care shall be provided where
permanent physical damage could result to such child." An Ohio
court has held, in State v. Miskimens,79 that the Ohio exemption is
unconstitutional because it violates the establishment clause of the
first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 0 Still other courts have interpreted these exemptions
in such a way as to circumvent their purpose.81 In the wake of the
repeal of the federal requirement that exemptions be adopted, no
state has seen fit to abolish its exemption altogether, although many
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3993-94.
77. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 300 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-3-103(a) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (Supp. 1990).
78. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1990).
79. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. Coshocton 1984).
80. Id. at 44-47, 490 N.E.2d at 934-36.
81. See People ex reL D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Colo. 1982), cited in Note, "Suf-
fer The Little Children... ' Toward a Judicial Recognition of a Duty of Reasonable
Care Owed Children by Religious Faith Healers, 16 HOFsTRA L. REV. 165, 171 n.35
(1987). In that case, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the dependency adjudica-
tion of a child for the sole reason that the parents relied on spiritual means alone to
cure a child with a life-endangering condition. The court interpreted the phrase "for
that reason alone" in the child neglect statute, which did not allow a finding of neglect
when the child was being treated safely by spiritual means, to mean that "other rea-
sons" could be considered, such as deprivation of medical care to the point of life en-
dangerment. People ex rel D.L.E., 645 P.2d at 274-75.
state legislatures are under pressure to repeal such statutes.8 2
These statutory exemptions for spiritual healing are not deeply
rooted in our nation's legal history. They are of very recent vintage,
given over two-hundred years of jurisprudential history in this coun-
try. They are also clearly the result of lobbying efforts by a very
powerful special interest group, the Christian Science Church.83 This
lobbying effort at the federal level in fact resulted in state agencies
being forced to ask their state legislatures to pass statutory exemp-
tions in order to qualify for federal funding. The widespread exist-
ence of these exemptions cannot be traced to a groundswell of feeling
in individual state legislatures that the needs of parents who practice
spiritual healing were an important interest that needed protection.
Finally, the federal government has retracted the requirement that
states enact such statutes in order to qualify for funding. The federal
government now states that in cases where there is harm or substan-
tial risk of harm to the child's health or welfare, its policy is not neu-
tral but requires that such cases should be reported to the local child
protection agency.
This Article has established three basic premises upon which a dis-
cussion of the repeal of statutory exemptions must rest. The first
premise is that children whose parents practice spiritual healing to
the exclusion of medical treatment are dying unnecessarily. The sec-
ond is that, historically, many state courts have refused to hold that a
parent's constitutional right to free exercise of religion is a defense to
a criminal prosecution for failure to provide medical care to a child
who subsequently dies. The third premise is that such statutory ex-
emptions, upholding a parent's free exercise rights in the face of his
or her child's need for medical treatment, are not part of a longstand-
ing jurisprudential tradition in this country.
Given these three basic premises, this Article next analyzes the
constitutional framework in which conflicts arise between the child,
the parent, and the state as to whether the free exercise rights of the
parents or the medical needs of the child should prevail.
IV. FREE EXERCISE VERSUS A CHILD'S RIGHT TO MEDICAL
TREATMENT
A. Are Statutory Exemptions Constitutionally Mandated?
Why should statutory exemptions from child abuse and neglect
laws exist in the first place? Parents whose religions have spiritual
healing as a fundamental tenet might argue that absent such exemp-
tions the state child abuse and neglect statutes, which require parents
82. Wong, supra note 28, at 14.
83. Chambers, supra note 28.
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to provide medical care for their children, would be unconstitutional.
In the absence of such exemptions, these statutes are arguably un-
constitutional where they compel medical treatment in direct conflict
with a parent's belief that spiritual healing, to the exclusion of medi-
cal treatment, is essential to curing the child and necessary for the
parents' and the child's ultimate salvation.
Prince v. Massachusetts,84 decided in 1944, is one of the most signif-
icant cases in the line of United States Supreme Court decisions
which embrace the conflict between a parent's right to free exercise
of religion and state legislation which inhibits free exercise by re-
stricting the parents' autonomy in making child-rearing decisions. In
Prince, the Court upheld the state statute at issue even though it
clearly impinged on parental free exercise.8 5 However, twenty-eight
years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 6 the Court rendered its most ex-
pansive reading of parental free exercise to date. There, the Court
upheld a parent's right to practice religion in the face of a state stat-
ute which arguably inhibited such free exercise. An examination of
the two cases demonstrates why statutory exemptions which protect
parents who practice spiritual healing are within the ambit of the
Court's analysis in Prince rather than in Yoder.
In perhaps the most powerful Supreme Court case supporting the
proposition that such statutory exemptions are not constitutionally
mandated, the Court in Prince directly confronted the issue of
whether a parent/guardian's free exercise rights should yield in the
face of a child's health and welfare.8 7 Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Wit-
84. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
85. Id. at 170-71.
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. 321 U.S. 158, 166-67, 170. The line of United States Supreme Court cases which
establishes the point at which the state's interest in fact overrides an individual's free
exercise right begins with Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds,
the Court directly addressed the issue of whether religious belief can serve as justifica-
tion for an act which is otherwise made criminal by the state. The case involved the
prosecution of George Reynolds, a practicing Mormon, for bigamy in violation of
Utah's antipolygamy law. Id. at 146. Reynolds argued that his prosecution was barred
by the free exercise clause of the first amendment. A unanimous Court rejected this
position and upheld the conviction of Reynolds, stating that its acceptance of the argu-
ment "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at
167. Chief Justice Waite, writing for the Court, seemed to be especially troubled by
the slippery slope problem inherent in Reynolds' position:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under
which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife relig-
iously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pyre of her
ness, was convicted of violating two Massachusetts statutes restricting
the conditions under which a child could sell newspapers and
magazines on a street or in a public place.88 She had allowed her
niece, nine-year-old Betty Simmons, to accompany her during an eve-
ning's preaching on the streets of Brockton. The child carried and of-
fered pamphlets for sale.8 9
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction
of Sarah Prince.90 She appealed to the United States Supreme Court
on the grounds that the two Massachusetts statutes violated the first
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. Sa-
rah Prince argued that the statutes abridged her freedom to practice
her religion as guaranteed by the first amendment and applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.91 She buttressed this ar-
gument with a claim of parental right as guaranteed by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.92
The Court was called upon to perform a delicate balancing of inter-
ests. On one side, there was the "earnest claim for freedom of con-
science and religious practice," coupled with a parent's decision-
making authority in child-rearing.9 3 This claim of parental control
embraced not only secular matters but also religious interests.
Where implicated, religious convictions serve to heighten the conflict
between state regulation and religious freedom.94 The countervailing
interest was society's interest in protecting the welfare of children
and the state's assertion of authority to that end.95
The Prince Court acknowledged that it had previously recognized
the right of parents to give their children religious training and the
right of children to free exercise of their religion in the face of state
regulation and contrary public sentiment.96 It reiterated its position
"that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to pre-
vent her carrying her belief into practice?
Id. at 166. '
88. 321 U.S. at 159-60.
89. Id. at 162. The record indicated that Betty had asked to accompany her aunt,
who was her legal guardian, on the trip downtown that night. Id.
90. Id. at 160.
91. Id. at 164.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 165.
94. 1&
95. Id.
96. Id. at 165-66. The Court referred to West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state may not compel Jehovah's Witness to salute American
flag in violation of religious beliefs); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(state may not mandate attendance at public schools in violation of a child's right to
receive and a parent's authority to provide both religious and secular schooling);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (sustaining a child's right to receive teaching in
foreign languages as against state encroachment).
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parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."97
While reciting its position that parental rights were cardinal, the
Court went on to articulate the general principle that "the family it-
self is not beyond regulation in the public interest."9 8 The state, in
its role as parens patriae, may limit the parent's control by, for ex-
ample, mandating attendance at school,99 and developing child labor
laws.100 Accordingly, the Court emphasized that the state's "author-
ity is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to
control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience."'101
The Court articulated the rule that the "[s]tate's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults."'
0 2
The activity involved in Prince, a child selling religious literature on
the street, was admittedly within the state's regulatory control even
though a parent's freedom to exercise her religious beliefs and to
raise her children was restricted. Legislation appropriately designed
to combat the "crippling effects of child employment" was within the
state's police power, even in the face of the "parent's claim to control
of the child," or the parent's claim that religious scruples dictate ac-
tion contrary to the child labor law.103
Prince established the principle that, while free exercise may re-
quire that religious practices which affect adults may stand in the
face of secular statutes which impinge upon those practices, the same
religious practices must yield when they affect the health and wel-
fare of children. Parental rights are not absolute when a parent's
religious beliefs cause him or her to act contrary to legislative enact-
ments which reflect societal norms regarding what is essential to a
child's well-being.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,10 4 the Court pointed out that its holding in
Prince was limited to cases where the child's physical or mental
health was in danger of harm. Citing its decision in Sherbert v. Ver-
97. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
98. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890)).
99. Id. (citing State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901)). Compare Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
100. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (citing Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S
320 (1913)). Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
101. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
102. Id. at 168.
103. Id. at 168-69.
104. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
ner,105 the Court in Yoder stated:
On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise
Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious
beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord with one's religious
convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.' The conduct or
actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order.1 0 6
The Yoder Court concluded that, unlike Prince, the Yoder case was
not one which involved "any harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare." 107
Respondents in Yoder were members of the Old Order Amish reli-
gion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. Wisconsin's
compulsory school-attendance law required respondents to send their
children to school until the age of sixteen. The children - Frieda
Yoder, age fifteen, Barbara Miller, age fifteen, and Vernon Yutzy, age
fourteen - had all graduated from the eighth grade of public school.
Their parents refused to send them to public school after that time
and were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory-attendance
statute.10 8 The convictions were reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court on the grounds that the state had failed to make an adequate
showing that its interest in "establishing and maintaining an educa-
tional system overrides the defendants' right to the free exercise of
their religion."109 The state appealed the reversal to the United
States Supreme Court.
Respondents argued that compulsory high school attendance con-
flicted with both the Amish religion and the Amish way of life.
Sending their children to high school would precipitate censure by
the church community and would endanger the parents' and the chil-
dren's salvation." 0 The Court accepted this argument and affirmed
the reversal of the convictions. It applied a balancing test whereby
the state must establish that either the statute does not violate the
free exercise of religion or that the state has a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify infringement of the free exercise clause." Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that:
[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond
the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance inter-
feres with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must
appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise
of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. 406 U.S. at 230 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 207-08.
109. Id. at 213 (citing the decision of the state supreme court, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 447,
182 N.W.2d 539, 547 (1971)).
110. Id. at 209.
111. Id. at 214.
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interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.1 12
In deciding the case in favor of the Amish parents, the Court also
rejected the state's asserted distinction between regulation of "be-
liefs" and regulation of "conduct."1 1 3 The Court stated that in cases
of this sort, "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments. 11 4 The Court also rejected the state's argument that
because the statute was neutral on its face and did not discriminate
among groups it could not be unconstitutional.115 The Court found
that a facially neutral regulation may be found unconstitutional in its
application where it unduly infringes upon the free exercise of
religion.11 6
Thus, while Prince involved a law intended to protect the physical
safety and well-being of children, Yoder involved a state statute
whose intent was to ensure the education of the state's children. The
cases are thus clearly distinguishable in terms of the level of the
compelling state interest at stake. The physical safety of a child is of
greater concern and significance than the training of the child to be-
come a productive citizen. The Court has shown a willingness to pro-
tect parental rights to free exercise where the religious beliefs of the
parents are in direct conflict with state statutes mandating compul-
sory education.117 However, in Prince, the Court has clearly drawn
the line between a parent's right to inculcate his or her child with
the parent's religious beliefs and enactment of a state statute protect-
ing the physical safety of children. While the state must yield in the
former case, the parent's free exercise must yield in the latter.11S
112. Id.
113. Id. at 219-20.
114. Id. at 220.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
117. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), supra notes 104-16. See
also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (sustaining parents' authority to
provide religious schooling).
118. The issue of training also arguably relates more closely to religious beliefs,
which have traditionally been more fully protected, than to actions taken as part of
religious practice. However, after the Court made the distinction between belief and
practice in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878), the line between the
two has become increasingly blurred. As the Court stated in Yoder, the two cannot be
separated into "logic-tight compartments." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. In the case of
Christian Science, the issues of medical treatment and the physical safety of the child
strike very close to a basic tenet of Christian Science as a religion because they impli-
cate the Church's central belief that spiritual healing is the preferred method of deal-
ing with disease and illness.
B. The Case Against a Constitutional Requirement for Statutory
Exemptions
Under what circumstances has the United States Supreme Court
established a doctrinal necessity to "carve out" exemptions in stat-
utes which infringe upon a citizen's free exercise of religion? In
Sherbert v. Verner,"9 the United States Supreme Court held that a
Seventh-Day Adventist could be eligible for unemployment compen-
sation even though she did not agree to work on Saturday. 20 The
Court held that in the absence of a compelling state interest, the
state could not require an applicant for unemployment compensation
to satisfy even a legitimate condition, e.g., that a recipient be avail-
able to work on Saturdays, if such a condition conflicted with the re-
cipient's sincere religious practices.121 As Justice Harlan stated in his
dissent, the decision in Sherbert effectively forced the state to carve
out a religious exception to the offending statute.122
Since the Sherbert case, the concept of forcing the state to carve
out religious exemptions has drawn fire. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
stated that when "a State has enacted a general statute, the purpose
and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the free
exercise clause does not... require the State to conform that statute
to the dictates of religious conscience of any group."123 Justice Ste-
vens has also expressed disapproval of such exemptions in stating
that there is "virtually no room for a constitutionally required ex-
emption on religious grounds from a valid . . . law that is entirely
neutral in its general application."124 Other leading first amendment
scholars agree.' 25 In fact:
Some twenty-five years after Sherbert, the legitimacy of [the religious exemp-
tions] doctrine has increasingly come under attack, and the survival of the
principle of free exercise exemptions is very much in doubt. Since 1972, the
Court has rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption to come before
119. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
120. Id. at 409-10.
121. Id. at 406-09.
122. I1& at 420 (Marean, J., dissenting). See also McConnell, The Origins and His-
torical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412
(1990).
Other United States Supreme Court cases which have effectively created exemptions
from statutes which infringed upon the religious beliefs of some citizens include: West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (state may not compel
Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the American flag in violation of their religious beliefs);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (state may not require a religious oath
as a condition for public office).
123. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 723 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
125. McConnell, supra note 122, at 1418 (citing P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW (1962)); Kurland, The Irrelevance Of the Constitution: The Religious Clauses Of
the First Amendment And the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978); Tushnet, "Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 373
(1989)).
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it, outside the narrow context of unemployment benefits governed strictly by
Sherbert.1 2 6
Most recently in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith,127 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reiterated the prin-
ciple that the free exercise clause does not require that the state cre-
ate an exemption for citizens whose religious beliefs may conflict
with a generally applicable law.128 The case involved the denial of
unemployment compensation benefits to petitioners who used peyote,
an illegal drug, for religious purposes. The United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether Oregon's prohibition of the
religious use of peyote was permissible under the free exercise
clause. The Court concluded that it was and that no exception need
be made to Oregon's general law prohibiting peyote use for those per-
sons who used the drug for religious reasons.129 Justice Scalia noted
the limited scope of Sherbert v. Verner, and declined to use the test
established therein to require an exemption from the generally appli-
cable Oregon law.130
Justice Scalia noted that the only decisions in which the Court had
held that the first amendment prohibited the application of a neutral,
generally applicable law were cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, which involved the free exercise clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections such as the right of
parents to direct the education of their children.131 However, the
Court affirmed the soundness of Prince v. Massachusetts, which in-
volved such a hybrid of constitutional interests, but which implicated
the health and welfare of a child as opposed to the right of parents to
educate their children in conformance with their religious beliefs. 3 2
Both federal and state courts have relied on Prince in refusing to
carve out exceptions for parental free exercise in the face of state ac-
tion which inhibits a parent's right to refuse medical treatment for a
child because of religious beliefs. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King
County Hospital '33 was decided in June 1967 by a United States Dis-
trict Court in the state of Washington. The case arose when a group
126. Id. at 1417.
127. 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
128. Id. at 1606.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1602-03.
131. Id. at 1601. The Court also cited Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(the Court rejected a flat tax on the solicitation and dissemination of religious ideas);
see also Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
132. 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
133. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam).
of Jehovah's Witnesses brought suit seeking to enjoin a broad range
of judicial and medical entities from administering blood transfusions
to their minor children against the plaintiffs' wills and without their
consent.13 4 In addition to various statutory, common law, and consti-
tutional challenges, plaintiffs argued that because their religion abso-
lutely prohibits the ingestion or absorption of blood,135 the
defendants' administration of blood transfusions to their minor chil-
dren constituted a violation of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. 3 6
Relying explicitly upon the Supreme Court's decision in Prince,
the District Court rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise clause claim
and, ultimately, dismissed the entire complaint.137 The District
Court specifically quoted the Prince case for the general proposition
that: "The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to
expose . . . the child . . . to ill health or death."1SS On appeal, the
Supreme Court, citing Prince, affirmed the District Court's decision
per curiam.139
In People v. Labrenz,140 the Supreme Court of Illinois was asked to
review an Illinois State Circuit Court order appointing a guardian for
an eight-day old child suffering from erythrobastosis fetalis and au-
thorizing the guardian to consent to a blood transfusion.141 The par-
ents were Jehovah's Witnesses and they challenged the actions of the
circuit court as violative of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment.142 The Illinois Supreme Court determined that Reyn-
olds v. United States143 and Prince were controlling precedent, and
thereby ruled that neither the circuit court's actions, nor the Illinois
statute on which the circuit court relied, were in conflict with the re-
quirements of the first amendment.44
In Walker v. Superior Court,145 the Supreme Court of California
held, in an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the trial court,
that despite the existence of California's statutory exemption, the
state could prosecute Laurie Walker, a Christian Scientist.146 The
state charged Walker with involuntary manslaughter and felony
134. Id. at 491.
135. Id. at 504.
136. Id. at 502.
137. Id. at 505, 508.
138. Id. at 504 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)).
139. 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam).
140. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
141. Id. at 619-20, 104 N.E.2d at 771.
142. Id. at 625, 104 N.E.2d at 773.
143. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See supra note 87 for discussion.
144. Labrenz, 411 Ill. at 625-26, 104 N.E.2d at 774.
145. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253, Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989).
146. Id. at 129, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
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child-endangerment, following the death of her four-year-old daugh-
ter from acute meningitis after Walker responded to her daughter's
illness with spiritual healing in lieu of scientific medical treatment.147
Walker challenged the legal propriety of the prosecution on a
number of grounds,148 including an assertion that the statutory ex-
emption should be extended to the manslaughter and child endanger-
ment statutes,149 and that her conduct under the circumstances was
absolutely protected from criminal liability by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment.150
As did the federal district court in Jehovah's Witnesses v. King
County Hospital,151 and the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Labrenz,152 the California Supreme Court in Walker looked to
Prince for guidance and rejected the defendant's free exercise
claim.153 The court stated: "As the court in Prince recognized, par-
ents have no right to free exercise of religion at the price of a child's
life, regardless of the prohibitive or compulsive nature of the govern-
mental infringement. 154
147. Id. at 118-19, 763 P.2d at 855-56, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.
148. Laurie Walker eventually entered into a settlement with the state whereby
the district attorney agreed to submit the question of guilt or innocence to a superior
court judge who would make the determination based on the evidence presented at a
preliminary hearing in September 1984. Under California law, this arrangement ena-
bled Laurie Walker to appeal her conviction. As part of the settlement, Walker was
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and was given a sentence of up to six-hun-
dred hours of community service but no jail term. The Christian Science Monitor,
June 25, 1990, at 8.
149. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 123, 763 P.2d at 858, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
150. Id. at 138-39, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
151. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 589 (1968) (per curiam).
For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
152. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952). For a discussion of
the case, see supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
153. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139-41, 763 P.2d at 869-71, 253 Cal. Rptr. 18-20.
154. Id. at 139-41, 763 P.2d at 869-71, 253 Cal. Rptr. 18-20. The court went on to dis-
miss the argument that the omission/act distinction should be given weight in this
kind of case. It noted that the church argued at length over the "purportedly pivotal
distinction between the governmental compulsion of a religiously objectionable act and
the governmental prohibition of a religiously motivated act." Id. The court stated
that, even accepting that there was some force to the distinction, such a distinction had
no relevance in this case because Prince established "that parents have no right to free
exercise at the price of a child's life, regardless of the prohibitive or compulsive nature
of the infringement." The court further cited United States Supreme Court cases
which upheld laws resulting in the compulsion of religiously prohibited conduct where
the state exhibited an interest no more compelling than that asserted in the Walker
case. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (law compelling vaccination of
children for communicable diseases upheld despite religious objections by parents);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (government's right to compel consci-
entious objectors to make war upheld despite religious objections)).
C. The Constitutional Defects of Statutory Exemptions
It is well established that when a fundamental right such as the
right to free exercise of religion is at stake, the Court will apply strict
scrutiny to the statute which purportedly violates that right. In or-
der for the statute to withstand scrutiny, the state must show that a
compelling state interest exists in order to override the individual's
fundamental constitutional right. In addition, the state must estab-
lish that the statute at issue is narrowly tailored to achieve the state's
interest. Even with the distinction and narrowing of Prince that oc-
curred in Sherbert and Yoder, the protection of the health and wel-
fare of children through child abuse and neglect statutes should still
rise to the level of a compelling state interest. Child abuse and ne-
glect statutes clearly fall within the narrow groove, carved out in
Sherbert and reiterated in Yoder, which contains statutes to protect
children from harm to their physical or mental health.
The compelling interest that the state has in protecting children
from injury or death also cannot be consistently achieved by any less
restrictive means, e.g., by including some version of a spiritual. heal-
ing exemption which requires parents to provide medical treatment
if their child is in danger of serious or permanent injury. Many par-
ents, like the Twitchells or Laurie Walker, are not able to recognize
the symptoms of a life-threatening illness like a bowel obstruction or
meningitis. Apparently, neither were Christian Science practitioners
or nurses in those cases. A more restrictive exemption requiring
medical care only where a child is in danger of serious or permanent
physical injury would not have saved Robyn Twitchell's life. Neither
Robyn's parents, the Christian Science practitioner, nor the nurse
who attended him recognized that Robyn was in a life-threatening
situation. Only a statute which unequivocally stated that the Twitch-
ells had an absolute duty to provide Robyn with medical care would
have caused them to take him to a physician who was trained to rec-
ognize and treat the medical problem that killed Robyn. Such a
clear-cut statute would have been the least restrictive means by
which the state's compelling interest in preserving Robyn's life
would have been achieved.
The statutory exemptions at issue are often restricted to parents
who practice spiritual healing as a result of belief in a "recognized
religion."155 The first amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits the making of laws which result in the establishment of
religion. 5 6 In Walker v. Superior Court,157 Justice Mosk in his con-
155. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1990). For text of the
Massachusetts' exemption, see supra note 4.
156. The establishment clause of the first amendment reads: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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currence noted that there are two broad categories of legislation
under this constitutional proscription: laws "[a]ffording a uniform
benefit to all religions," and laws "[t]hat discriminate among reli-
gions." 5 8 Mosk stated that laws affording a uniform benefit to all re-
ligions have traditionally been scrutinized for constitutional validity
under the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.159 In order to satisfy the Lemon test, a law: (1) must have a
secular purpose; (2) its principal effect must neither advance nor in-
hibit religion; and (3) it must not foster excessive entanglement with
religion.16 0
The second group of laws, those discriminating among religions,
"strike closer to the heart of the establishment clause prohibition and
thus require more demanding scrutiny." 6 1 As the court stated in
Larson v. Valente, "the clearest command of the establishment
clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially pre-
ferred over another."'162 The governmental policy in enacting a law
is presumptively suspect and subject to strict scrutiny where such a
law effectuates a preference among religions.16 3 Justice Mosk con-
cluded that the spiritual healing exemption itself was constitutionally
defective because it violated the establishment clause of the United
States Constitution. 64 The state's only arguable interest in such dif-
ferential treatment of religions was to "facilitate the administration
of the statute" by readily "identifying indicia of sincere religious be-
lief.' 16 5 Even though subject to the strictest scrutiny, such discrimi-
nation among denominations could not be justified simply by
administrative convenience.16 6 In addition, Justice Mosk concluded
that the spiritual healing exemption failed the three part test set out
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.167
Thus, not only is there no mandate under the first amendment for
157. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
158. 47 Cal. 3d at 145, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (Mosk, J., concurring)
(citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 145, 763 P.2d at 873-74, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 145, 763 P.2d at 874, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
162. Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)).
163. Id. (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 246).
164. Id. at 148, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
165. Id. at 149-50, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 150, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
such statutory exemptions, but they are arguably constitutionally de-
fective under the very same amendment. Because they discriminate
among religions by preferring "recognized religions" over "non-recog-
nized religions," and because they necessarily engage the courts in an
evaluation of the nature of the basic tenets of religious sects, they
should fail as constitutionally defective.
A similar approach was adopted in State v. Miskimens,168 in which
the court defined and analyzed the constitutional issues posed by
statutory exemptions in a clear and concise manner. Larry and
Roberta Miskimens were charged with violating the Ohio child en-
dangerment law in the death of their child, Seth. They had practiced
spiritual healing to the exclusion of medical treatment. Both the
state and the parents in Miskimens attacked the constitutionality of
the Ohio statutory exemption.169 In an interesting twist, the Chris-
tian Science Church, in its role as amicus curiae, was the only party
which took the position that the statutory exemption was
constitutional.170
The court first addressed the state's challenge to the exemption as
unconstitutional because it was a law respecting an establishment of
a religion or giving preference to certain religions.171 In concurring
with the state's argument, the court cited Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion 172 and Lemon v. Kurtzman173 to support its finding that the
statute as written caused an impermissible entanglement with reli-
gion.174 The court stated that the statute:
hopelessly involves the state in the determination of questions which should
not be the subject of governmental inquisition . . .such as what is a "recog-
nized religious body," by whom must it be "recognized," for how long must it
have been "recognized," what are its tenets, did the accused act in accordance
168. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. Coshocton 1984).
169. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Baldwin 1987). That statute read in perti-
nent part:
No person, being the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or
control, or person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen or a mentally or
physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, shall create a
substantial risk to the health or safety of such child, by violating a duty of
care, protection, or support. It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection,
or support under this division when the parent, guardian, custodian, or person
having custody or control of a child treats the physical or mental illness or
defect of such child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in accordance
with the tenets of a recognized religious body.
The Miskimens case is unusual in that the state was challenging the constitutionality
of its own statute. The court addressed the issue of whether the state had standing to
challenge the statute and found that it did. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 44 n.2, 490
N.E.2d at 933 n.2.
170. Id. at 44, 490 N.E.2d at 933.
171. Id
172. Id at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934-35 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
173. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
174. Id
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with those tenets, what are "spiritual means," and what is the effect of com-
bining some prayer with some treatment or medicine. 1 7 5
Secondly, the Miskimens court rejected the position of the amicus
curiae that the statute was a valid effort to accommodate the needs
of minority religions.17 6 The court cited Prince and found that "the
right to hold one's own religious beliefs, and to act in conformity
with those beliefs, does not and cannot include the right to endanger
the life or health of others including his or her children."'177
Thirdly, the court adopted the state's argument that the statute vi-
olated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee. The
court reasoned that, "if the real purpose of [the neglect statute] is to
protect children from parental defalcation, then the prayer exception
creates a group of children who will never be so protected, through
no fault or choice of their own." 178 To bolster its equal protection ar-
gument, the court noted the protection afforded an unborn but viable
fetus in Doe v. Bolton179 and Roe v. Wade.180 The court analogized
the rights of the unborn child to the rights of children born but un-
able to medically care for themselves. In both situations the court
determined that equal protection must be afforded.181
Finally, the court accepted the defendant's argument that the stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague.182 The court reiterated the tests
for vagueness - a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[s] to provide
fair notice,"18 3 it "result[s] in arbitrary and unequal enforcement," 8 4
175. Id. at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934. Note that the Miskimens court did not engage in
the more sophisticated analysis provided by Justice Mosk's concurrence in Walker v.
Superior Court. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text for a discussion by Jus-
tice Mosk of the constitutional standards applicable to laws which afford a uniform
benefit to all religions and those which discriminate among religions. Justice Mosk
noted that the strict scrutiny analysis is the proper standard for laws that discriminate
among religions. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. However, the less
stringent test of Lemon v. Kurtzman is applicable to laws affording a uniform benefit
to all religions. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. Presumably, if a law
such as the Ohio exemption were unconstitutional under the Lemon test, it would also
be unconstitutional under the tougher strict scrutiny analysis.
176. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 45-46, 490 N.E.2d at 935. Counsel for amicus
curiae gave examples of such statutes that have previously been upheld in the past in-
cluding, "selective service laws, tax laws, school laws, Sunday closing laws, [and] medi-
cal practice laws." Id. at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 935.
177. Id. at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
178. Id. at 46, 490 N.E.2d at 935.
179. Id. at 46, 490 N.E.2d at 936 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
180. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
181. Ld. at 46-47, 490 N.E.2d at 936.
182. Id. at 48-49, 490 N.E.2d at 937-38.
183. Id. at 47, 490 N.E.2d at 936 (citing State v. Sammons, 48 Ohio St. 2d 460, 462,
391 N.E.2d 713, 714 (1979), appeal dismissed, 111 U.S. 1008 (1980)).
and it "proscribe[s] conduct that is, by modem standards, normally
innocent."185 The court felt that the statutory exemption failed, in
particular, to provide fair notice to the defendants.
The court dismissed the charges against the Miskimens because the
statutory exemption was unconstitutionally vague. 86 In so doing,
however, the court stated:
At the request of the mother, this court permitted her to absent herself from
the trial during the autopsy phase of the trial. Perhaps that was a serious mis-
take on my part because the sad, brutal fact is that Seth Miskimens died.
From what started as a common childhood illness, from what started as a sim-
ple, easily recognizable, well-known bacterial infection which responds to the
most basic of modern antibiotics ... Seth Miskimens died. First came illness,
then more serious illness, then suffering, and then as valiant a struggle as his
tiny heart and his weakened lungs would permit. And then after enduring for
as long as he could the tremendous pain inherent in the multiple diseases that
were attacking him, and then with a raging infection in his tiny chest, he
weakened, he faltered, and he died. There is no more gentle way to describe
it.1 8 7
While the court felt compelled to dismiss the criminal charges
against the Miskimens, it warned parents that, "as of June 15, 1984, a
new standard of parental duty will prevail in this jurisdiction and
they should exercise their beliefs with prudent awareness of that fact
and its potential secular consequences."laa
The Miskimens court did not flesh out the equal protection argu-
ment as clearly as it did the first amendment and vagueness defects
in the Ohio statutory exemption. However, the court might have
grounded its finding that the statutory exemption violated the four-
teenth amendment in the following analysis. The exemptions dis-
criminate on their face against a particular class of children, those
whose parents practice spiritual healing. Statutes which have dis-
criminated against classes of children such as illegitimates, have, in
the past, been struck down under an equal protection analysis.'8 9 It
is not likely that such a class of children, those whose parents prac-
tice spiritual healing, would, under current United States Supreme
Court doctrine, rise to the level of a "suspect class." 'If it did meet
requirements for suspect classification however, strict scrutiny would
apply to the statutory exemptions and would require the state to
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id, at 47-49, 490 N.E.2d at 937-38.
187. Id. at 49, 490 N.E.2d at 938.
188. Id at 50, 490 N.E.2d at 939.
189. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (worker's compensation statute violated equal protection
clause where unacknowledged illegitimate children are denied equal recovery rights);
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death statute violated equal protection clause where it
prohibited recovery by parents for death of an illegitimate child). The test the Court
has used in these cases is a rational relation test "with teeth." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767.
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have a compelling state interest in order to discriminate against such
a class of children.190 If this group of children is not a suspect class,
then the court would apply a lower level of scrutiny to the statutory
exemption and would only have to find that it was "rationally re-
lated" to the state's purpose in enacting it.191
Arguably, the purpose behind the states' enactment of child abuse
and neglect statutes, within which the exemptions are found, is to
protect children by requiring their parents to provide them with ade-
quate food, shelter and medical care.192 Given this purpose, the ex-
emptions are not rationally related; they in fact thwart the purpose
of the abuse and neglect statutes because they result in certain chil-
dren being deprived of the kind of medical treatment necessary to
preserve their lives.
Those defending the exemptions might argue that in fact, the pur-
pose which should be evaluated in this context is not the purpose of
the overall statute in which the exemption resides, but rather the
purpose of the exemption itself, which is to protect the parents' free
exercise rights. They might claim that the statutory exemption is not
only rationally related to the parent's free exercise rights but also
that the state has a compelling interest*in protecting the constitu-
tional rights of those citizens who believe in spiritual healing to the
exclusion of medical science. As suggested above, however, this pur-
pose is by no means constitutionally mandated; in fact, the statutory
exemptions run afoul of the very constitutional provision which they
purport to protect. The statutory exemptions force the courts to
evaluate the nature of religious sects and to decide which religions
come within the ambit of the statutory protection. They are not sup-
ported by the compelling state interest necessary to justify a statute
which discriminates among religions. Thus, they are in themselves
constitutionally defective. 193
190. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 & n.14 (1982).
191. Id. at 216. The Court also explained the role of "intermediate scrutiny" for
certain types of cases. Id. at 218 n.16.
192. But see Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989), for the majority's view that the statute at
issue was a support statute. The court seemed forced to adopt this view in order to
achieve the result of not extending the statutory exemption to the endangerment and
manslaughter statutes. But in his dissent, Justice Broussard argued that clearly the
primary purpose of the statute was not support, but rather was to protect the child
from injury. Id. at 154-55, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
193. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), cert. granted, 327 U.S. 773,
rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (indictment dismissed because grand jury was drawn from an
Some commentators have noted that judicial invalidation of stat-
utes under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
is more acceptable when the class which is being discriminated
against is not likely to be effectively represented in the political pro-
cess. 194 The argument that courts should not usurp the will of the
people as represented by the legislature is weakened where the judi-
ciary is affording its special protection to persons inadequately repre-
sented in the legislature.195 This is certainly the case where the
interests of children are at issue. The Christian Science Church has a
powerful lobby at both the federal and state levels.196 For children
whose parents practice spiritual healing, there is no concomitant
method to lobby state legislatures in opposition to such statutory
exemptions.
Finally, there is merit to the argument that these statutory exemp-
tions, when read together with the criminal law, are unconstitution-
ally vague and do not give parents fair notice of their potential
liability.197 Such exemptions are misleading in a legal community
where parents have previously been convicted of manslaughter in the
death of their child. In many cases, sentences are levied after parents
have been informed by their church that, because of the existence of
a statutory exemption in their state, 1 98 they cannot be held liable for
failure to provide medical care to their children. These parents face
not only the anguish of their child's death but also the pain of a crim-
improper panel). The respondents were indicted and convicted of mail fraud based on
their solicitation of donations for a religious movement whose fundamental tenets, the
indictment charged, the respondents "well knew" were false. Id. at 79-80. In deciding
whether it was necessary for the government to prove that the religious representa-
tions made by the respondents were false, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
stated that the freedom of religion guaranteed by the first amendment:
[E]mbraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the here-
after which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials
are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Reli-
gious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible
to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not
mean that they can be made suspect before the law.
Id. at 86-87.
In their treatise on constitutional law, Professors Rotunda, Nowak, and Young state
flatly that: "It is clear that the religion clauses forbid an inquiry by any branch of gov-
ernment, including the courts, into the truth or falsity of asserted religious beliefs." 3
R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE, § 21.11 at 421 (1986).
194. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 218 n.14 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
195. See id.
196. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
197. But see Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 143-44, 763 P.2d 852, 873, 253
Cal. Rptr. 1, 22 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989), where the court found that
the statutes at issue were not unconstitutionally vague.
198. For an example of such an assertion see supra note 3.
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inal trial, where their motives and their character are subject to the
daily scrutiny of the media and the public. Repealing the statutory
exemptions will provide parents with a much clearer direction re-
garding the nature of the legal duties owed to their children. Such
clarity is a laudable goal in a legal system which aspires to deter, as
well as punish, such behavior.
The court in Miskimens approached the question of the constitu-
tionality of the Ohio statutory exemption in a straightforward way,
mindful not only of the fundamental principles involved but also
mindful that a child had died. The fact that it felt compelled to dis-
miss the charges against these parents makes it clear that statutory
exemptions operate to thwart justice and endanger children. The
court in Walkerl99 felt compelled, in the face of the California ex-
emption, to enter into a tortured analysis as to the purpose of the
statutes at issue in order to avoid dismissing criminal charges against
Laurie Walker for failure to provide her daughter with medical
care.200 The legal community should support a national effort to re-
peal these exemptions which force courts to either dismiss such
charges or to engage in a convoluted analysis in order to allow prose-
cutions to go forward.201
V. CONCLUSION
A national effort to repeal statutory exemptions for parents who
practice spiritual healing to the exclusion of medical treatment for
199. For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 145-54.
200. See When Rights Clash, supra note 31, at 615, where the author raises the
question of whether the Walker opinion is "founded on sophistry and semantics."
201. Another argument in favor of outright repeal of these exemptions follows
from the fact that all the parents who have recently been convicted of their children's
deaths have not been given jail terms but rather have been given probation and re-
quired to perform community service. See Wong, supra note 29. Judges appear reluc-
tant to sentence otherwise caring and loving parents to jail. In a society where we rely
on general respect for the criminal justice system in order to maintain law and order,
such convictions and sentences tend to reduce rather than enhance respect for the
legal system.
For example, Michael Czaja was recently convicted of welfare fraud and sentenced
to a five-year jail term by Justice Sandra Hamlin, the same judge who sentenced the
Twitchells and gave them probation as opposed to a jail term. Mr. Czaja and his wife
lied to welfare authorities and told them that he was not living with his family in their
home. If he had been living there, the family would have been ineligible for welfare
benefits. Mr. Czaja argued that he had to both work and collect welfare in order to
have enough money to provide for his four children. After his sentencing, Mr. Czaja
said: "How could [Judge Hamlin] let the Twitchells go, after they killed their kid, and
then do this to me when all I wanted to do is try to feed my kids?" Boston Globe,
August 27, 1990, at 14, col. 4.
their children could proceed on three fronts; the judicial, the legisla-
tive, and the regulatory. Such reform should begin immediately at
both the state and federal levels. However, should the issue be
timely presented the United States Supreme Court could most
swiftly and effectively eliminate these exemptions by adopting the
analysis presented in both the Miskimens decision and the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Mosk in Walker. The Court should adopt the
approach in Miskimens and clearly state that child abuse and neglect
statutes serve a legitimate state interest, that exemptions thereto for
spiritual healing are not mandated by the free exercise clause of the
first amendment and may moreover violate the establishment clause
of the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
In addition to federal and state judiciaries adopting the Miskimens
analysis and declaring these statutes unconstitutional, state legisla-
tures should repeal the exemptions. These statutory exemptions are
not constitutionally mandated and it is within the purview of the
state legislatures to abolish them. There is already pressure on many
state legislatures to repeal these exemptions,20 2 and the deaths of
children like Robyn Twitchell should provide the impetus for this
statutory reform movement to succeed. States should also move to
strengthen mandatory child abuse and neglect reporting laws so that
these cases are brought to the attention of the courts before it is too
late to order life-saving medical treatment.
Finally, because it bears some responsibility for the states' enact-
ment of statutory exemptions, the Department of Health and Human
Services should regulate them out of existence. Since the Depart-
ment required states to adopt these exemptions in order to be eligible
for federal funding, it should now prohibit them as being injurious to
some children's very survival. Ideally, the Department should condi-
tion the receipt of funds under the Federal Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act on abolition of these exemptions. 203
There is little doubt that Ginger and David Twitchell loved their
son Robyn. There is also little doubt that Robyn Twitchell would
probably be alive today if Massachusetts did not have a statutory ex-
emption which led the Twitchells to believe they were immune from
prosecution for failure to provide medical treatment to their son.
And in the end, that is the strongest argument for abolition.
202. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
203. See supra text accompanying note 66.
